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Empirical studies show that many supply chain integration and collaboration efforts are 
challenged with issues over channel power imbalance and control rather than mutual, win-win 
intentions [1]. Channel power here refers to an agent’s relative ability to control the decision 
making process in the supply chain. Channel firms have differing amounts of relative power due 
to size, brand identity or other parameters, and such differences have significant effects on 
operational decisions and overall efficiency. Channel efficiency is a measure of the performance 
of the system compared to the centralized system which is subject to improvement by first 
identifying the intra-chain dynamics which cause inefficiency and then modifying the structure 
of these relationships by applying suitable contract. Supply chain contracts help to more closely 
align individual incentives with global optimization targets. They divide profits, and distribute 
costs and risks arising from various sources of uncertainty, e.g. market demand, selling price, 
product quality, and delivery time between the entities in the supply chain. However, utilizing 
contract when there are competing producers in the supply chain, has received less attention in 
the literature. The current work seeks to study this situation by modeling a two-supplier-single-
retailer supply chain while assuming the two suppliers could be imbalanced in power. This 
model is then applied for analyzing the biodiesel niche market in Singapore by considering the 
competition between new biodiesel producers and current fossil fuel producers. The agents’ 
profits and total channel efficiency are examined under different market conditions to determine 
how the suppliers’ optimal decisions differ with respect to the substitution degree of products. 
Initially, to gain better insight into the biodiesel market, the feasibility of producing biodiesel in 
Singapore is reviewed. Presently, advanced technologies to utilize biomass as a large scale 
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source of energy have been developed by engineers in National University of Singapore (NUS). 
However, in simple economic terms, biomass-derived fuels are at a disadvantage. Compared to 
petroleum-based diesel, the high cost of biodiesel is a major barrier to its commercialization as 
traditional economic analyses rarely take into account the environmental and health benefits 
associated with the utilization of an environmentally friendly resource. This dissertation explores 
the potential for new feedstocks to be converted to biodiesel in order to reduce production costs. 
The results show that collecting waste oil from commercial and industrial grease separators and 
households for a waste-to-energy program is a reasonable strategy to lower costs. Furthermore, 
based upon the numerical example developed in the study, it is shown that utilizing revenue 
sharing contract could help both producers increase their profits while it is also in favor of end 
customers and leads to higher demand. Conducting more extensive numerical examples is left for 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Supply Chain Coordination 
A decentralized supply chain is referred to as being coordinated if it can achieve the same profit 
as in a centralized scenario. Choosing proper coordinating contracts can lead to agents’ 
individual decisions being optimal for the supply chain as a whole and to reach the same 
performance as an integrated system.  However, aligning individual incentives for channel 
efficiency is a challenging task. In fact, the powerful companies, given their dominant positions, 
have little incentive to regulate their power, while the small firms have relatively little flexibility 
in opting out of these games of power [1]. Analyzing the situations when imbalanced power 
firms agree to contract has received less attention in the literature. The focus of this dissertation 
is on the use of contracts under different power structures by modeling a two-supplier-single-
retailer supply chain while assuming that one supplier could hold greater power than another. As 
there exists a strategic interaction among the agents’ decisions, game theory is applied to model 
the interactions and the optimal decisions of the channel members are obtained.  
The model is then utilized to analyze the biodiesel niche market in Singapore where there are a 
new biodiesel producer and an existing diesel producer and it is assumed the diesel producer has 
greater power than the biodiesel producer.  We explore the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game 
in two different competition levels through numerical examples and show how adopting 
contracts could affect the profits and the efficiency. 
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1.2 Biodiesel as an Alternative Fuel 
To gain better insight into biodiesel production competition, the fuel market in Singapore is 
briefly reviewed. Singapore as a modern country is highly dependent on oil. One of the major 
fuel consumers is the transportation section which contributes to about 19% of the total CO2 
emissions of the country, with the fossil fuel-based (primary consumption) transport sub-sector 
accounting for 17% which shows the significant contribution of the transport sector in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. While oil currently supplies much of the Singapore’s energy 
and transportation demand, the increasing difficulty of constant supply and the associated 
problems of pollution and global warming are acting as major impetuses for research into 
alternative renewable energy technologies. The future growth of the country highly depends on 
overcoming energy resource limitations and the government is currently promoting many 
programs such as deployment of compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles and the provision of 
green vehicle incentives (e.g. additional registration fee rebates) but the need for investigating 
new marketable, alternative sources of energy is obvious. 
Biodiesel is a promising option among available environmentally friendly energy sources. It is a 
renewable and biodegradable diesel fuel with less harmful emissions than petroleum-based diesel 
fuel. The recycling of CO2 with biodiesel contributes to a 78% reduction of CO2 emissions. Also, 
the presence of fuel oxygen allows biodiesel to burn more completely resulting in fewer 
unburned materials [2]. 
This dissertation initially seeks to study the potential of producing and utilizing biodiesel as an 
alternative fuel in Singapore and determine the estimated volume and quality of available 
feedstocks that can be used to produce biodiesel. The organization of the thesis is as follows. In 
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Chapter 2 the feasibility of biodiesel production and the availability of feedstocks in Singapore 
are investigated. Chapter 3 focuses on developing models of the supply chain and obtaining the 
optimal decisions and tries to investigate the coordination mechanisms. In Chapter 4 numerical 
examples are conducted to clarify the proposed model. Finally in Chapter 5 we summarize our 
results and propose some further research directions.  
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Chapter 2: Biodiesel Production 
2.1 Introduction 
Biodiesel refers to a vegetable oil or animal fat-based diesel fuel consisting of long-chain alkyl 
(methyl, propyl or ethyl) esters. It is typically made by chemically reacting lipids (e.g., vegetable 
oil, animal fat) with an alcohol. The most common way to produce biodiesel is by 
transesterification, which refers to a catalyzed chemical reaction involving vegetable oil and an 
alcohol to yield fatty acid alkyl esters (i.e., biodiesel) and glycerol (Figure 2.1). 
  
Figure 2.1 Transesterification reaction 
The most popular source for producing biodiesel is vegetable oil such as rapeseed oil which is 
generally favored in Europe, palm oil which is most commonly used in Asia and soybean oil, 
which is favored in US. In addition to these oils there are several other vegetable oils, such as 
corn, flax, sunflower, and peanut which are available but with a higher price. Many research 
efforts have been done to find other crops which can be used as biomass. Kadam et al. [3] study 
the use of rice straw as biomass in California. They review different harvesting techniques and 
determine a total delivered cost of 20$/ton using post harvesting baling and high density bales. 
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Mani et al. [4] describe and characterize the grinding properties of several crops in terms of 
energy required for grinding. Lewandowski et al. [5] study four varieties of perennial grasses and 
show that the high yields, low input requirements and multiple ecological benefits make 
perennial grasses a good source of biomass for US and Europe. Switchgrass and miscanthus are 
the two species with the best potential. The overall potential for biomass production has been 
estimated through number of researches [6-10]. 
An advantage of the using vegetable oil crops for biodiesel is the employment and rent increase 
in agricultural areas, as well as the impact over related industries. In Europe it is important to 
stress that it is most economic for the farmer to produce energy crops on set-aside land in order 
to receive the subsidies defined within the European Union agricultural policy. 
On the other hand, although plant feedstocks are highly used in the world, they may cause some 
problems. Much of the biofuel that Europeans use are imported from Brazil, where the Amazon 
is being burned to plant more sugar and soybeans, and Southeast Asia, where oil palm 
plantations are destroying the rainforest habitat of orangutans and many other species. 
In addition, according to the report by the organization for economic development (OECD), 
biofuels will have a major impact on the farming sector. Even without demand for the green fuel, 
recent falls in output will keep the feedstock prices high. Although the national farmers’ union 
said that UK agriculture already has enough capacity to meet the nation's demand for both food 
and fuel crops, it seems that it would affect the feedstock prices such as sugar, palm oil etc. and 
also food prices. The report also describes that the grain required to fill the petrol tank with 
ethanol is sufficient to feed one person per year. Assuming the petrol tank is refilled every two 
weeks, the amount of grain required would feed a hungry African village for a year.  
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Another main concern is that biodiesel produced from plant feedstocks is not economical yet. 
Compared to petroleum-based diesel, the high cost of biodiesel is a major barrier to its 
commercialization. It costs approximately one and a half times that of petroleum-based diesel 
depending on feedstock oils [11,12]. According to previous studies, approximately 70–95% of 
the total biodiesel production cost arises from the cost of raw material [13,14]. Therefore, finding 
a cheaper alternative to the conventional feedstock is the most logical means of reducing 
production cost. One of the promising ideas is to recycle the wastes. Using waste water, grease, 
oil, plastics etc. could greatly reduce the cost of biodiesel because they are available at a 
relatively low price. In addition, biodiesel production from wastes offers double environmental 
benefits as it’s both renewable and recycled. Since biodiesel production from waste grease would 
not compete with food supplies and due to several other unique advantages such as having better 
energy balance and being more effective in reducing the greenhouse gasses, it has attracted the 
majority of attention to itself lately. In the following we review some of the waste-to-energy 
practices carried out for producing biodiesel. 
2.2 Literature Review 
The economic feasibility and further reduction in the cost of biodiesel production has been a 
major subject of research. Finding a cheaper alternative to the conventional feedstock is the most 
logical means of reducing production cost. Soap stock [15], waste grease [16,17], and rendering 
plant products [18] are potential alternative feedstocks that make biodiesel production 
economically viable. Soap stock, a byproduct of the refining of vegetable oils, is a potential 
biodiesel feedstock. By means of simple chemical methods, this low-quality underutilized 
feedstock can be used to produce biodiesel. This product is comparable in composition, similar 
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in engine performance and emissions, and predicted to be more economical to produce than 
biodiesel from refined soybean oil [15]. 
Another example is the meat industry wastewater. Meat processing plants use huge amount of 
water. Only a small amount of this quantity becomes a component of the final product; the 
remaining part is wastewater of high biological and chemical oxygen demand, high fat content 
and dry residues [19]. According to Jonhs [20], meat industry wastewater is rich in oils and 
greases, sanitizers and blood. They may cause some environmental problems and the operational 
costs related to the discharge, land disposal and re-use of wastes are high. Rennio et al. [21] 
suggest utilizing this biofuel (dried sludge) for steam generation which has shown to be a viable 
alternative. This type of fuel has a high heating value, and it is a renewable energy source. They 
show that the utilization of this sludge as a biomass fuel for steam generation, reduces disposal 
and processing costs, as well as avoids environmental and health problems for staff and 
community close to these industries, and establishes a cheaper and cleaner energy source for the 
meat industry segment. 
Recycling technology for converting plastic wastes to oil has also drawn much attention in the 
world. The basis theories and the technology for industrialization of plastic liquefaction have 
been developed in Huang et al., and Li et al. [22,23]. 
Another important biofuel feedstock is waste cooking oil (WCO). According to Green Oasis 
Environmental Incorporation, one gallon of waste oil can contaminate one million gallon of 
water. In addition, waste grease in sewers can cause many problems for water reclamation plants. 
Currently WCO is a disposal problem. If this waste grease is used as a fuel, it would not only 
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provide another source of energy, but it also increases the value of waste grease making it a 
commodity instead of a disposal burden. 
Waste cooking oil has been introduced in the biodiesel production line as early as 1994 when the 
first industrial WCO biodiesel plant was commissioned in Austria. This was followed by a 
market gain in its popularity in 1998 and 1999, when set-aside lands for industrial crop 
production had been abscised to 5%, crude vegetable oil costs were high, and petrodiesel prices 
were at record low [24]. Since then many efforts have been made to the development of waste 
cooking oil as a biodiesel feedstock [25-27]. The sources of the waste feedstock, particularly 
restaurants and catering establishments, have jumped into the bandwagon of WCO biodiesel 
production. McDonald’s in Austria, for example, recovers WCO from their outlets and converts 
it into biodiesel. The biodiesel produced is used to run the Austrian truck fleet of McDonald’s 
[28]. McDonald’s Austria installed this process in 2003 and the practice is expanding, most 
recently in Malta. In Manila, police are looking to convert their patrol cars to run on a mixture of 
diesel and used cooking oil from McDonald’s. And finally in the UK, McDonald's recently 
started using its own waste cooking oil to make biodiesel, which will be then used in its entire 
truck fleet of 155 vehicles [28]. The conversion of used cooking oil into biofuels for 
transportation vehicles, heating, and other purposes is being actively pursued in the recent 
McDonald’s Worldwide Corporate Responsibility Report [28]. According to the McDonalds’ 
Environmental Report 2004, in all European countries they decided to collect and recycle used 
oil from the fryers. At the end of 2003, more than 90 percent of all restaurants were integrated in 
a recycling scheme for waste oil. They have actively pursued recycling capacities for their used 
oil in the chemical industry and an increasing amount for the production of biofuels. The 
objective is to create a closed chain so that used oil from restaurants goes into the production of 
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biodiesel, which in turn can be used by the distribution trucks. Recycling this way reduces not 
only waste, but the demands on non-renewable resources and emissions that contribute to climate 
change. At these times of high all prices companies are also benefiting from the favorable costs 
of biofuel, together with an enhanced public relations image. 
Another success story in the application of WCO biodiesel is the Malta initiative. A local 
company has ventured into recovering WCO from household and commercial establishments in 
Malta and converted this into biodiesel. The company offers a free waste oil collection service 
from catering outlets and hotels at no cost and provides 1 liter of free oil for every 25 liters of 
donated used cooking oil. The biodiesel produced from WCO yielded a competitive price of 28 
cents per liter as compared to 29 cents for mineral diesel. The price differential is expected to 
widen as the mineral diesel price in Malta is expected to rise in the next few years [29]. 
A recent study by Montefrio [30] has been done to determine the technical and economic 
feasibility of the production and utilization of biodiesel derived from waste cooking oil in 
Marikina city. It explores the engineering, environmental, social science, economics and policy 
perspectives of a novel waste-to-energy program, by evaluating the environmental implications 
of such a program, as well as the legal and political capacities needed for project realization. 
The interest in biodiesel production from WCO is rising as more and more government agencies 
and private companies realize the huge volume of waste grease produced in urban areas. In a 
recently commissioned study by the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory [31] on urban 
waste grease production in the metropolitan areas in the United States, an average of 9 
pounds/year per person of yellow grease (waste cooking oil) and 13 pounds/year per person of 
trap grease were produced in 1998. According to this paper, the studied metropolitan areas had 
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an average of 1.4 restaurants per 1000 people which shows an enormous potential reservoir of 
alternative feedstock that is waiting to be tapped for biodiesel production. 
In the next section, we investigate alternative feedstocks available in Singapore which can be 
converted to biodiesel. The required feedstock can be obtained from two main resources: grease 
interceptors and households. In the following, we examine these two resources in more details. 
2.3 Feedstocks Available in Singapore  
2.3.1 Waste Grease from Grease Interceptors 
Currently restaurants and other food establishments are required to have devices known as grease 
traps. These grease traps can help to prevent the expulsion of waste vegetable oil and grease into 
the sewer system. Waste grease from grease interceptors is collected by contractors and sent to 
water reclamation plants for disposal. The products of the current disposal process of waste 
grease are sludge and biogas (methane). The biogas produced during the anaerobic digestion 
process is used for heating in plant power generation by the dual fuel engines and the sludge 
after anaerobic digestion is for disposal. To obtain more details about the process involved (i.e. 
frequency of collection, cost of service, eventual destination of extracted grease, etc.) in 
emptying the grease interceptors an interview was carried out with the senior manager of the 
water reclamation network department, public utilities board (PUB). 
According to the interview, there are approximately 6,300 grease interceptors in Singapore. The 
size of grease interceptor varies from 1 cubic meter to 1.5 cubic meters. Currently 21 contractors 
are involved in extraction of greasy wastes from the grease interceptors and all are delivering to 
PUB. The cost of service is a commercial arrangement between the contractor and its clients. 
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The extracted greasy wastes are sent to PUB's water reclamation plant for disposal and PUB 
charges the contractors disposal fee of $7/m3. 
The maintenance frequency varies with the intensity of usage. It is the responsibility of the 
premises owner to determine the optimal maintenance period. However, the maintenance interval 
could vary from once a week to once every 2 months. Assuming 6,300 grease interceptors with 
size of 1.25 m3, with a removal once per month then this approximately equals to 7.8 million 
liters of feedstock per month.  At 90% yield approximately 7 million liters of biodiesel can be 
produced per month from the waste grease collected by PUB. 
We also collected some sample of the waste grease reached to PUB. According to the 
preliminary laboratory analysis this greasy waste has the necessary properties to be converted to 
biodiesel in a two-step catalyzed biodiesel reactor. However, there may be a need to retrofit a 
pre-treatment step into the external biodiesel producer’s system to handle the high 
free fatty acids (FFA) content of the waste grease. 
Depart from the waste grease which is sold to PUB for disposal, there are huge amount of waste 
cooking oil that are collected by several companies in Singapore.  This waste cooking oil which 
can also be a great potential for producing biodiesel is currently sold to overseas facilities for 
processing into animal feed, soap and wax. 
2.3.2 Waste Grease from Households 
In order to determine the estimated volume and quality of waste grease generated by households, 
questionnaire surveys and informal interviews were conducted. The survey questionnaires (see 
Appendix A) were distributed to 20 students of National University of Singapore who were 
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randomly selected. They were asked to collect the waste cooking oil generated by their family 
for one month and record the following information in a sheet: 
 Approximate volume of WCO generated by the households; 
 The type and brand of the oil which they usually use; 
 The number of times the oil is re-used. 
The questionnaire survey was designed to answer the following questions: 
 What is the quality of the used cooking oil upon recovery after it is recycled several times 
for cooking? 
 What is the current practice in the disposal of used cooking oil at the household level? 
 How much cooking oil is consumed per average household in Singapore? 
 How much potential WCO can be recovered based on household perception and 
experience? 
 How willing are the residents of Singapore to participate in this initiative? 
A short background of the study was given at the start of the survey to acquaint the respondents 
with the study. Based on the results of the survey and the WCO samples, the waste grease 
collected by students has the required quality in order to be converted to biodiesel. Furthermore, 
the estimated waste cooking oil generated by each family member is around 200 ml per month. 
Results also show that about 70% of the respondents are willing to continue the collection of 
their waste oil if the government starts a comprehensive project on WCO collection. According 
to these results waste cooking oil from household provides a good potential as biodiesel 
feedstock in Singapore. 
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In summary, the future of biodiesel production from waste in Singapore appears promising due 
to numerous benefits beyond simply the financial returns. Energy independence, greenhouse gas 
mitigation, and waste reduction are among the benefits. Several other issues, such as unstable 
fossil fuel prices, advancement in gasification and gas turbine technology, and speedy market 
development of bio-based co-products (pulp wood or chemicals), could also provide a healthy 
market for bio-energy in the future. Potential future carbon policies that reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions will also make biomass feedstock more competitive with fossil fuels. And biomass 
energy can become a viable alternative in the Singapore energy future. The largest market for 
biodiesel probably will be as a fuel additive. Biodiesel may also be marketed for applications in 
which reducing emissions of particulates and unburned hydrocarbons are paramount, such as 
school and transit buses. Because additives that improve diesel fuel properties can sell for a price 







Chapter 3: Producer’s Revenue Sharing Contract 
3.1 Introduction 
Empirical studies show that many supply chain integration and collaboration efforts are 
challenged with issues over channel power imbalance and control rather than mutual, win-win 
intentions [1]. Differences in power between supply chain agents can have significant effects on 
operational decisions and overall supply chain efficiency. To capture the effect of imbalance in 
power between the two producers, in this chapter we consider different possible channel 
configurations in a two-supplier-single-retailer supply chain. Two possible relative power 
configurations are constructed, where S1 and S2 denote the supplier/producer 1 and 2, 
respectively, and R denotes the retailer (Figure 3.1). If S1 holds more (bargaining) power than S2 
in the supply chain, it is represented by S1→S2, and S1↔S2 indicates that S1 and S2 both have 
equal decision-making power. As shown in Figure 3.1, in the first structure, both suppliers have 
equal decision-making power over the retailer; and the second case captures the situation when 
S1 is dominant in the market, holding more power than S2. 
 
Figure 3.1 Supply chain power structures 
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In the following we analyze pricing games between the agents based on these two structures and 
we obtain the optimal strategies of each player. We continue our analysis by investigating the 
impact of adopting revenue sharing contract by suppliers on the supply chain members’ profits 
and channel performance. 
3.2 Literature Review 
In this section we review some of the references related to our work. We highlight those that 
explore the effect of supply chain power through game theoretic formulations and focus on how 
different supply chain structures and decision hierarchy affect the choice of contracts in 
coordination. We also study models that analyze the (R, T) policy which is applied in our supply 
chain formulation.  
There are several works related to supply chain power. Choi [32] examines how channel profits 
for two manufacturers and one retailer vary under different divisions of channel power by using 
different game-theoretic models to represent different divisions of channel power. Kadiyali et al. 
[33] extend the vertical Nash and Stackelberg leader-follower interactions between two 
manufacturers and a retailer studied by Choi to a continuum of possible channel interactions. 
Trivedi [34] also follows Choi’s work by modeling a channel structure in which there are 
duopoly manufacturers and duopoly common retailers. Lee and Staelin [35] examine the impact 
of channel price leadership in a supply chain. Liu et al. [36,37] model a scenario where power 
refers to the ability of an agent to determine an ex-ante value for retail price markup. Etgar [38] 
and Stern and Reve [39] analyze the impact of power on performance; and Brown et al. [40] 
examine the impact of channel power on inter-firm relationships. 
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Granot and Yin [41] study system performance and supplier coalition under the assumption of 
suppliers having equal power for two cases: first, suppliers move to set wholesale prices and the 
retailer follows by setting the stock size; second, the retailer moves first in setting wholesale 
prices and suppliers follow with stocking decisions who also retain the overstock risk. Wang [42] 
also studies system performance, but assumes the retailer serve as the Stackelberg leader over the 
suppliers, and suppliers can move either simultaneously or sequentially in pricing and production 
decisions; also see Jiang and Wang [43]. Bernstein and DeCroix [44] investigate multi-tier 
assembly systems in which the downstream firm(s) holds higher decision-making power over the 
upstream agents, and all firms at the same tier move simultaneously. Carr and Karmarkar [45] 
and Corbett and Karmarkar [46] study competition within a multi-echelon assembly supply chain 
with a deterministic demand assumption. Most of the previous supply chain interaction models 
are typically either two-stage Stackelberg games or one-stage non-cooperative games with all 
suppliers sharing an equal or balanced power. Shi [47] in his study examines situations when 
suppliers have an unequal decision making power over each other so that one or more suppliers 
can exercise Stackelberg leadership over the other suppliers and explores the influence of each 
agent’s decision making power on the strategic interactions and performance within a multi-
supplier-one-retailer supply chain. 
Previous studies show different power structures lead to different channel performance. 
Generally a centralized system, where a single decision maker has the ability to make all 
decisions regarding inventory allocation, manufacturing policies, shipping frequency, etc. 
provides a first-best solution for overall supply chain profit (see [48,49]). However, a 
decentralized supply chain, in which each agent seeks to optimize his own expected profit, leads 
to sub-optimal solution [50]. That is, the profit of a decentralized supply chain is less than that of 
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an integrated supply chain due to a lower stock quantity or a higher retail price. Due to this 
effect, it is desirable to design proper contract forms to improve the overall efficiency. Supply 
chain coordination models aim to identify agreements that increase the overall performance and, 
if possible, induce the channel to achieve the same profit (or cost) as in the centralized scenario. 
A well designed contract can lead to an agent’s individual decision being even optimal as a 
whole for the supply chain. In this case, there will be no double marginalization, that is, the 
supply chain is coordinated. Contracts that provide coordination have been vastly studied in the 
literature. For instance, see return policies [51-53], revenue sharing [54], quantity discount 
[55,56], quantity flexibility [57], sales rebate [58], options contract [59], price discount or “bill 
back” contracts [60]. Also see Tayur et. al [61], Cachon [62], Lariviere [63], and Sahin and 
Robinson [64] for excellent reviews. 
We conclude our review with a discussion of those centralized and decentralized models that 
analyze the (R, T) policies. In a (R, T) policy, the inventory position is reviewed every T periods 
and an order is placed, if necessary, to raise the inventory position back to R. The majority of the 
papers that analyze (R, T) systems assume customer demand is deterministic [65,66]. The 
authors develop heuristics for fixed interval ordering policies (e.g. power-oftwo) that are very 
effective in most settings. Analysis of (R, T) policies when demand is stochastic has received 
much less interest. Promising results have been achieved through the use of heuristics, e.g. 
Naddor [67,68], who analyzes so-called "# policies, which are identical to (R, T) policies, in both 
deterministic and stochastic environments. The author proposes heuristic solutions for cases 
when the distribution of demand is known. Atkins and Iyogun [69] propose a heuristic that finds 
a lower bound on the cost of the optimal (R, T) policy. Eynan and Kropp [70] propose a 
simplified (approximate) cost function to study the single product, periodic review problem. 
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They propose simple heuristics to address the joint replenishment problem for multiple items. 
Rao [71] finds the optimal single-item (R, T) policy for a compound Poisson and a Brownian 
motion demand processes. The author also studies how the deterministic (R, T) policy and the 
(Q, r) optimal policy compare to the optimal (R, T) policy and proposes a power-of-two (R, T)-
based heuristic to analyze the multiproduct joint replenishment problem. Another related 
reference to the (R, T) model is Cachon [72], who analyzes the influence of order size and 
delivery frequency on supply chain demand variability. 
Applying periodic inventory review policy (R, T), we extend previous studies by proposing a 
model for analyzing the effect of asymmetric power within the supplier group where suppliers 
could choose to offer revenue sharing or conventional wholesale price contracts. Reviewing 
different channel coordination contracts, it is clear that the outcomes and structure of these 
contracts highly depend on the agents’ relative channel power, which may be a function of the 
agents’ relative size, market presence, etc. However, the effect of channel power on model 
performance in presence of contracts has not been extensively studied. An important contribution 
of our study is that it explores the impact of applying revenue sharing contract on the supply 
chain performance where two competing suppliers are imbalanced in power. 
In the following, by utilizing a generic model of the two-supplier-single-retailer supply chain, we 
extend the analysis of channel power to include the situation that suppliers can adopt revenue 
sharing contract. We study and derive the unique Nash equilibrium solutions for two non-
cooperative games with random price dependent demand in which suppliers offer substitutable 
products to a common retailer under periodic inventory review policy ((R, T) policy). Stochastic 
price sensitive demand functions are built for two substitutable products, and given these demand 
26 
functions, optimal pricing rules for the producers and the retailer are obtained. Since the pricing 
strategy of one firm affects the demand streams of other firms, there exists a strategic interaction 
among the agents’ decisions; therefore game theory is applied to analyze this problem. 
3.3 Modeling Framework 
Consider a supply chain consisting of three risk neutral firms, two producers/suppliers and one 
retailer where all players possess full information. The products are shipped from the suppliers to 
the retailer at a wholesale price and then the retailer sells substitutable products of both 
producers to a price-sensitive market. The producers could apply revenue sharing or 
conventional wholesale price contract. Under the revenue sharing contract, the supplier is paid a 
wholesale unit price, plus an agreed percentage from the profit the retailer generates. 
At the beginning of the time horizon, the supplier  and the retailer agree to a contract with one 
parameter 
, which is the retailer’s share of revenue from each unit sold. Based on this 
formulation, a conventional wholesale price contract is a special case of revenue sharing with 

  . Given the share of the revenue, the producer  chooses his wholesale price$
 and the 
retailer determines the retail price%
. All decisions are made once at the beginning of the time 
horizon and they remain unchanged throughout its duration. 
The product  is produced at a unit cost of	




 per unit per 
period at the producer  (retailer). The producer  utilizes outsourcing at a cost of  per unit, if a 
retailer order cannot be satisfied. A lost sale penalty of  incurs at the retailer for each lost 
demand. To avoid the trivial case when it is optimal for the retailer to buy nothing, we enforce 
the constraint %
 & $
 and to avoid unrealistic outsourcing costs we require%
 '  ( . 
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Figure 3.2 shows the sequence of events over the time horizon in a periodic review policy. The 
sequence is initiated with a production run at the supplier, which will be used to replenish the 
retail inventory at the beginning of the next cycle. At the beginning of each replenishment cycle, 
the retailer has )

 units of inventory on-hand and places an order with the supplier that 




Figure 3.2 Sequence of events 
The producer  begins cycle + with )

 units in inventory (immediately after shipping to the 
retailer) and produces up to *

. The inventory level of product  for the producers and the 










 respectively. Because the lost sales 
penalty cost is high, both producers seek to avoid it when possible by setting -

   ' 
. 
where 
 characterizes the on-hand service level and is determined by producers considering 
their penalty costs in order to best responding to the uncertainty in demand. Furthermore, the 
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length of time between successive shipments (replenishment cycle), is considered unit and lead 
time between the supplier and the retailer is negligible. The retailer faces a random price 
dependent demand function/
 for the product :  /
  ,
 '  where  
( ) , 1,2 ( )i i i i j iX r r r for i j i jα β γ= − + − = ≠  (3.1) 
is a decreasing function that captures product substitution and the price dependency of the 
products, and  is a random variable assumed to follow the normal distribution; while 0  
represents the normal cumulative distribution function of, 1  the normal probability density 
function and  and. are the mean and standard deviation of, respectively. 
The coefficient 2
 represents the customer brand loyalty that is price independent, 
 represents 
product ’s demand sensitivity on its own retail price, and denotes the degree of product 
substitution, which accounts for the effect of retail price differences of the two substitutable 
products 2
 3 
3  (  [73]. Thus    represents the case when the two products are 
completely independent, and as increases, the degree of product substitution and consequently 
the competition between the two products, increases. 
3.4 Benchmark System 
In this section, we formulate the problem of the centralized scenario as our benchmark where a 
single decision maker chooses the retail prices of both products that maximize the expected 
supply chain profit. The base model used in this essay, is similar to as in [74] however we 
extended their model by considering the application of revenue sharing contracts and examined a 
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89  the total expected centralized channel profit from both products.  
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J denote the retailer’s and the supplier’s 
on-hand inventory of the product  respectively in cycle k. Then we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ){ }min ,2
C R R R R S S
i i i i i i i i i i i
S
S R Ri
i i i i i
Q r t r t h E Q D pE D Q h Q
h
t c Q Q E Q D
+ +
+
   Π = − − − + − − − −      
   + − + − −     
 (3.3) 
In order to meet the retailer’s demand and to avoid outsourcing costs, the supplier  chooses his 
inventory level *
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     Π = − + − + + − −         
 − − −  
 (3.4) 
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Proposition 3.1: In the centralized system, the total supply chain profit function is jointly 
concave in %9 and %7 and the optimal product ’s retail price is uniquely determined by 
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(3.5) 
Proof: Two decisions are made simultaneously. The Hessian matrix of the centralized profit 


























and there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. The optimal retail prices can be obtained by solving 
first order condition of45 for 3 P  3Q simultanously: 
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r c q E Q D r c
r
β γ α γ
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 (3.7) 
3.5 Decentralized System 
In the decentralized supply chain the supplier  is paid a wholesale unit price $
  by the retailer 
who in turn charges a retail price %




 is the 
retail margin. The retailer also shares a portion of the revenue to the producer in return for a 
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lower wholesale price, where 
 represents the portion of the revenue from product  to be kept 
by the retailer  R 
 S . 
The expected profit functions of channel members are given by: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )R R R R Ri i i i i i i i i i i i iQ r w r h w E Q D pE D Qϕ ϕ
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 Π = − + − − − −  
   + − + − −     
 (3.9) 












 ? /JM the suppliers profit can be simplified as: 
( ){ }( (1 ) )2
S
S R R S Si
i i i i i i i i i i
h
w c r Q E Q D h Qϕ
+ Π = − + − + − − −  
 (3.10) 
We apply our model for the two power structures shown in Figure 3.1 for the scenario that 

  , i.e., conventional wholesale price contract, and obtain the optimal decisions. 
3.5.1 Balanced Power Structure 
In balanced power structure, both suppliers are assumed to have equal power over the retailer. 
The suppliers declare their decisions first and then the retailer follows with responding by 
respective retail prices. Under this Stackelberg formulation where the suppliers hold greater 
channel power, each supplier chooses his wholesale price using the response function of the 
retailer, given the wholesale price of the competitor's product. Because we assume that all 
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players possess full information, thus the supplier i can deduce the retailer’s optimal response 
and plan accordingly. 
Proposition 3.2: In balanced power structure, the retailer’s reaction function given wholesale 
prices is jointly concave in9 and7 and the optimal policy for the retailer is: 
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 (3.11) 
Proof: The Hessian matrix is the same as in the centralized scenario and the condition for 
maximization is satisfied. 
Proposition 3.3: Taking the retailer’s reaction function into consideration the supplier ’ 
respective profit function is concave in $
 and the Nash equilibrium wholesale price for product 
 is:  
( ) ( )
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Proof: The second derivative of SiΠ  with respect to $
 is negative
2 2/ 0Si id dw b γΠ = − − <   and 
the optimal policy for producers are derived from the first-order conditions of respective profit 
maximization problem by solving (3.13) for   3Q simultaneously. Substituting the reaction 
function (3.12) in (3.11), the corresponding retail margin can be obtained. 
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 (3.13) 
3.5.2 Imbalanced Power Structure 
In this structure, the leader supplier takes the retailer’s and the follower supplier’s reaction 
functions into account for his own wholesale price decisions, while the follower supplier 
determines his wholesale price taking into account the retailer’s reaction function, given the 
leader producer’s decisions. The retailer’s optimal policy is the same as (3.11). 
Proposition 3.4: In the imbalanced supply chain model, the leader and the follower supplier’s 
profit functions are concave in $
 and the optimal wholesale prices are shown in (3.14) and 
(3.15). 
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Proof: The second derivative of 
2
SΠ  with respect to $7 given$9 and considering retailer’s 
optimal policy, is negative ( ( )2 22 2 0Sd dw bγΠ = − + < ). Again by taking both retailer’s and 
producer 2’s reaction function into consideration, the second derivative of 
1
SΠ with respect to $9 
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is negative (3.16) thus the maximization conditions are satisfied and therefore there exists a 













Π = − <
+
 (3.16) 
Now we are interested to analyze the optimal decisions obtained in this section in order to 
understand the effect of products substitution degree on retail and wholesale prices. Note that to 
ensure positive retail margins, it is necessary to assume ( ) 0R Ri i i iq E Q Dα
+ + − − ≥  











monotonically decreases in  and it reaches the integrated 
system’s retail price as  V ∞. It follows that for  S  R ∞, both product’s retail prices are 
higher compared to those of an integrated channel. In the same way, both wholesale prices 
monotonically decrease in  and they reach the respective unit cost at the producer level as 
 V ∞. Furthermore, we examine the firms’ optimal profit functions and the whole supply chain 
performance. It can be shown that 0 , 0 , 0
SC S R
i id d d
d d dγ γ γ
Π Π Π
> < >  which imply that the total supply 
chain profit improves with increase in competition among the suppliers and when the 
substitution degree is sufficiently high, the whole supply chain performs as an integrated system. 
Specifically, the retailer’s profit monotonically increases and gains the total supply chain profit 
when two products are completely substitutable, while the supplier i’s profits consistently 
decreases in  and it vanishes as  V ∞. 
Similar to wholesale price scenario, optimal decisions for revenue sharing contract can be 
obtained. However, the solutions are more complicated and cannot be analyzed in a 
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straightforward manner. Therefore, in the next chapter, numerical examples are conducted and 





Chapter 4: Projected Costs and Numerical Examples 
In this chapter we first review the projected prices of two popular biodiesel feedstocks: soybean 
oil and waste grease (yellow grease) and compare the production cost of biodiesel fuels by these 
two feedstocks based on the energy information administration’s (EIA) data. Then a more 
detailed analysis of biodiesel production processes and costs is provided and numerical examples 
are conducted by applying the proposed model described in chapter 3, while assuming that there 
are a current diesel producer and a new biodiesel producer. 
4.1 Biodiesel Production Costs 
The feedstock cost of the oil or grease is the largest single component of biodiesel production 
costs. The energy information administration uses a process-costing approach to model the 
impacts of net feedstock production costs plus capital and operating costs. Soybean oil and 
yellow grease price projections are depicted in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (Source: EIA).  
Table 4.1 Projected prices for soybean oil (2002 Dollars per gallon) 
Marketing Year 50 Million Gallons of 
Soybean Oil Used for 
Biodiesel Production 
200 Million Gallons of 
Soybean Oil Used for 
Biodiesel Production 
2004/05 1.95 2.22 
2005/06 1.91 2.17 
2006/07 1.87 2.15 
2007/08 1.84 2.12 
2008/09 1.86 2.20 
2009/10 1.89 2.25 
2010/11 1.94 2.35 
2011/12 1.99 2.41 
2012/13 2.06 2.47 
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Table 4.2 Projected prices for yellow grease (2002 Dollars per gallon) 











The comparison of projected production costs for diesel fuels (Table 4.3) shows that biodiesel 
from yellow grease is closer to being cost-competitive with petroleum diesel than is biodiesel 
from soybean oil, but the available supply of yellow grease will probably limit its use for 
biodiesel production. 
Table 4.3 Projected production costs for diesel fuels by feedstock (2002 Dollars per gallon) 
 
 
Marketing Year Soybean Oil Yellow Grease Petroleum 
2004/05 2.54 1.41 0.67 
2005/06 2.49 1.39 0.78 
2006/07 2.47 1.38 0.77 
2007/08 2.44 1.37 0.78 
2008/09 2.52 1.40 0.78 
2009/10 2.57 1.42 0.75 
2010/11 2.67 1.47 0.76 
2011/12 2.73 1.51 0.76 
2012/13 2.80 1.55 0.75 
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In Singapore, the waste grease can be bought from the waste collectors that currently dispose it 
to the Public Utilities Board (PUB). This waste collection infrastructure is also established in 
many other developed countries, and a new biodiesel producer could take advantage of this to 
lower grease collection and biodiesel production costs. 
From the collected waste grease, high-grade biodiesel is produced via an advanced conversion 
processes that takes approximately 24 hours to complete. Production of biodiesel involves a two-
step conversion process that has already been optimized and developed by engineers at NUS. 
The production process involves: separation of water and contaminants; acid pre-treatment to 
lower free fatty acids; chemical transesterification to biodiesel; and washing and dewatering of 
the biodiesel product. Conversion yield from waste grease to biodiesel is over 90% efficient. 
With the proposed process, high grade biodiesel is produced from low-grade waste oil as a 
cheaper and more environmental friendly alternative. The high margin of profit relative to other 
biodiesel producers who use conventional feedstocks, allows for the rapid development and 
expansion of waste to energy practices into local, regional and global markets. 
4.2 Numerical Examples 
This section focuses on analyzing the interactions between a new biodiesel producer and an 
existing diesel producer. It is assumed that the diesel producer is dominant in the market, holding 
more power than the new producer. This power structure is modeled as a three stage Stackelberg 
game where the leader producer G9 and the follower G7 represent diesel and biodiesel 
producers respectively. Based on the generic model constructed in chapter 3 we would like to 
examine if the less powerful producer G7 could increase his profits by adopting revenue 
sharing contract. 
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Four different scenarios are considered (=   ? W): the first scenario investigates the case that 
both producers offer the wholesale price contract to the common retailer, the cases that either 
producer one or two offers revenue sharing are modeled in scenarios two and three respectively, 
and the forth scenario studies the situation that revenue sharing is offered for both products. So 
optimal retail price X
U  and wholesale price X
U  refer to supplier i’s Y  3Q products under 




  and ,Z
. Following Lariviere and Porteus [75], the 
efficiency of the decentralized system in scenario =, is represented by KZ  4Z5 45[  where 





89  and 4
5 represent supply chain profit in scenario = and the centralized 
system profit respectively. 
The problem parameters are as following: for   3Q and under the linear and additive model, 
the random variable  is assumed to follow the normal distribution with mean 
   and 
standard deviation.
  ^. The total supply chain cost is 	9  W and 	7  _ and -

  `. The 
product market base and demand sensitivity are considered2
  a and
  ^ respectively. 
The on-hand service level is 




   and 
the penalty costs are assumed to be zero. Whenever wholesale price contract, or revenue sharing 
is offered by producer , the retailer’s share of profit is assumed 
   or 
  ^ 
respectively. With reference to Bichescu [74] for calculating the optimal decisions we use: 
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+     − − − = − −Φ +              
(4.2) 
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where Φ  and c  represent the standard normal cdf and pdf, respectively. We analyze and 
compare the supply chain performance under two different competition levels   @=D 
 assuming each producer has two strategies, offering revenue sharing contract or wholesale 
price contract. The optimal decisions and the agents’ profit percentages are calculated in four 
scenarios and summarized in Table 4.4 (when the products are non-substitutable   ) and 
Table 4.5 (when   ). Note that the centralized system profit is45 28,025. 
Table 4.4: Optimal decisions of channel members    
d e 2 3 4 
fde 35.3 12.4 35.3 12.4 
fdg 36.8 36.8 13.4 13.4 
hde 15.7 33.3 15.7 33.3 
hdg 14.9 14.9 33.3 33.3 
ide 51.0 45.7 51.0 45.7 
idg 51.7 51.7 46.7 46.7 
jde
k  3,675 3,267 3,675 3,267 
jdg
k  3,331 3,331 2,961 2,961 
jdk 7,006 6,598 6,636 6,228 
jde
l  7,350 9,800 7,350 9,800 
jdg
l  6,663 6,663 8,883 8,883 
jdlm 21,019 23,060 22,869 24,911 
nd 0.75 0.82 0.82 0.89 
ode 238.6 316.9 238.6 316.9 
odg 227.4 227.4 301.9 301.9 
od 466.0 544.3 540.5 618.8 
 
According to our numerical examples summarized in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, the following properties 
hold in both casesγ  pqrγ  : 
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77 S 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Table 4.5: Optimal decisions of channel members    
 
 
Comparing four scenarios it can be seen that when a producer offers revenue sharing, he charges 
lower wholesale price. Also in that case, the retail price is lower compared to the case that 
wholesale price is applied; which shows offering revenue sharing is in favor of the end 
customers and leads to higher demand. 
d 1 2 3 4 
fde 14.5 -5.0 14.5 -1.5 
fdg 14.1 11.9 -3.6 -1.7 
hde 26.1 40.4 21.8 33.3 
hdg 26.2 23.7 39.1 33.3 
ide 40.5 35.4 36.3 31.8 
idg 40.4 35.5 35.5 31.6 
jde
k  9,760 10,843 8,173 8,676 
jdg
k  10,764 10,787 11,685 9,568 
jdk 20,524 21,630 19,857 18,244 
jde
l  3,919 4,189 3,919 5,226 
jdg
l  2,927 2,212 3,903 3,903 
jdlm 27,370 28,031 27,679 27,372 
nd 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.97 
ode 378 482 378 503 
odg 414 460 551 551 
od 792 942 929 1054 
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It can also be seen that applying revenue sharing is in favor of the producer. Both leader and 
follower producers can increase their profits by utilizing revenue sharing contract. As discussed 
in chapter 3, by increasing the competition between the products (higher ) suppliers’ profits 
decrease. So our numerical example’s results show that revenue sharing contract could help both 
producers gain higher profit share of the whole supply chain even under high product’s 
substitution level. 
On the other hand, channel efficiency of the supply chain shows different behavior under 
different competition levels. When the products are not substitutable   offerenig revenue 
sharing by both products leads to the highest efficiency and offering wholesale price by 
producers results to the least efficiency. However, under higher substitution level,   , 
the scenario that only producer 1 offers revenue sharing (scenario 2) leads to the highest channel 
efficiency followed by scenario 3. Scenarios 1 and 4 achieve the same efficiency. 
The results show the impacts of substitution degree of products and suggests that adopting 
revenue sharing can be beneficial at the supply chain level and improves total efficiency since it 
allows the supplier to share the demand uncertainty risk with his retailer, but additional 
compensation mechanisms are needed to motivate the retailer to share more of risk in order to 
reach the higher channel efficiency. 
Note that our analysis is limited to study the pricing game under two specific substitution levels 
with specific demand and cost parameters. However, finding the Nash equilibrium of this game 
under all different substitution levels is complicated and the solution could differ in different 
situations. Analyzing other conditions is left for future work.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Work 
Contractual arrangements are efficient tools for channel members coordination and improving 
system-wide efficiency. Analyzing the agents’ optimal decisions in a two-supplier-single-retailer 
supply chain where the suppliers are balanced or imbalanced in power, this dissertation seeks to 
examine how adopting a revenue sharing contract divides the profits by sharing the risks. Based 
on the numerical examples, under certain conditions it is possible for the both producer to 
increase their profits by offering revenue sharing contract. However the results defer under 
different product substitution levels or demand conditions. The numerical examples explore 
some special cases while future work could examine other possible market conditions.  
The model used in this dissertation has relaxed several assumptions. However, it also has certain 
limitations. Firstly, the demand function is assumed to be linear which essentially simplifies the 
closed-form answers. Choi [32] shows that derivation of closed-form results is analytically 
challenging when nonlinear demand models are used, and the unique Nash equilibrium is no 
longer guaranteed. Further model generalization to nonlinear demand functions is useful for 
future research. 
Secondly, it is usually assumed that the revenue percentage of the suppliers and retailers is pre-
determined prior to the sales period. In the current work, it is assumed that this share of profit has 
a fixed value. However, another extension of this work could be to identify the optimal profit 
share between the supplier and the retailer. 
44 
Another limitation is the existence of symmetric information. Studies show all 
relevant information is not publicly available in reality. Therefore, the obtained results based on 
symmetric information assumption cannot explain the decisions in real market. 
In summary this dissertation presents an explicit investigation of channel power in the presence 
of contract. An important contribution of the study has been an exploration of the impact of 
offering revenue sharing on the optimal decisions taken under different supply chain structures 
when the producers are balanced or imbalanced in their respective power. This study serves as a 
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Appendix A: Waste Cooking Oil Sampling Exercise 
An overview of the study 
This study aims to explore the possibility of producing biodiesel from a low-grade feedstock, 
such as waste cooking oil (WCO) derived from the household sector. Biodiesel is a clean and 
cheap fuel and have many benefits to the society and the environment. Thus we are going to 
study the feasibility of its application in Singapore. For this reason, we need to gather the 
following information for our study:  
 Approximate volume of WCO generated by the households; 
 The type and brand of the oil which they usually use; and 
 The number of times the oil is re-used. 
The data from this exercise will help us gather an accurate estimate of waste cooking oil volume 
and quality generated nationwide.  
Please read the guidelines outlined below, follow the instructions and fill-in the attached record 
sheet for duration of one month. 
The guidelines 
Please follow the four steps: 
1- When you deem the cooking oil is not suitable anymore for re-use in cooking, pour it in 
the designated container; 
2- Read the cooking oil level in the graduation of the bottle;  
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3- Fill in the required data in the record sheet (i.e. date of disposal, level of oil, type and 
brand of oil, and number of times of re-use); and 
4- Continue the practice for one month. 
 
Final comments (Please answer in the space provided) 
After one month, when the procedure is finished, please answer the following questions. 
1- Did you have any difficulty collecting waste cooking oil? Please explain in more detail. 
________________________________________________________________ 
2- Do you have any suggestion to further improve the collection system? Please explain in 
more detail. 
________________________________________________________________ 
3- Now that you have experienced collecting waste cooking oil for a month, are you still 
willing to continue for a longer time if the government starts a comprehensive project on waste 





WASTE COOKING OIL USE RECORD SHEET 
SN Date Level of oil 
Type of oil (as 
seen on label) 
Brand of oil (as seen 
on label) 
Number of times 
the oil was reused 
Ex 20 Sept 2007 120 Canola Oil Naturel 2 
1      
2      





What is the type of the house you are living in? 
How many people are living in your house?  
HDB     Condominium   Private House  
